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1. The non-Communist members of the East German Government are at the moment riding the crest of a wave. They have at various occasions visibly been treated with greater honors by Soviet emissaries than the Communists. In the There is no doubt that the Communist leaders, especially Walter Ulbrich and Gerhart Eisler, are seriously worried that Russia may come to an agreement concerning Germany at their expense.
2. Highest in the Russian esteem at the moment seems to be Otto Nuschke, aged Vice Premier of the East German Government and leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Both Russian Ambassadors recently made it a point to treat Nuschke with special honors, and have ordered all minor Russian authorities in the East Zone to accede to his wishes whenever possible. Mr. Nuschke consequently feels elated and might tend to overestimate his chances. In a recent conversation with another highly placed CDU leader, he commented, "Don't worry, we are sure to get Stettin and Breslau back in time".
3. Georg Dertinger, in turn, [redacted] takes a more realistic view. In his opinion it is essential for the success of current negotiations that the problem of Germany's Eastern frontiers should not be raised now. He considered it important that West German leaders prevail upon Chancellor Adenauer not to mention this subject in his speech before the German Bundestag, and was depressed when, in his speech in Berlin Adenauer did raise the question after all. In Dertinger's opinion, the Russians will under no circumstances consent to negotiations about this question. The utmost he thinks Germany can obtain by patient negotiations are minor rectifications of the frontier and a possible partial resettlement of German refugees from the regions from where they have been driven out, but with these regions remaining under Polish sovereignty.

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4. It is believed that Dertinger stresses this point because the best way for anybody in the West to torpedo the present negotiations with the East is to raise the question of the Oder-Neisse Line.
5. Dertinger feels sure that this time the Russian offers concerning free elections, guarantees for supervision, etc., are meant seriously. He realizes that he has to secure further proofs of Russian good will, and plans, therefore, to suggest to Vishinsky that he endorse a blank check for Germany by making an official declaration that Russia will accept all decisions to which both German governments agree as far as the election, the necessary guarantees, and even the powers of the future Constituent Assembly are concerned. [redacted] Dertinger mentioned [redacted] that he thought that all the suggestions laid down by the so-called Koenigstein circle (exiled CDU politicians from the East now living in the West) could almost literally be taken over. [redacted] he entered into the question of personalities. He thought that as a result of elections the Social Democratic Party (SPD) would probably become the biggest party in united Germany, but certainly not as big as the party's leader, Dr. Schumacher, thought at present, and certainly not big enough to form a government alone. A coalition government would, therefore, certainly become necessary. Schumacher as Chancellor and head of a coalition government would be acceptable to the Russians.
6. As to Adenauer, Dertinger certainly thinks him unacceptable to the Russians, but believes that there are enough leaders in the CDU who have so far been prevented by Adenauer's assertive personality from obtaining prominence. This is true in Dertinger's opinion even of such leaders as Heinrich Brentano, Strauss, Otto Lenz, and others.
7. As to what the Russians consider "social progress" achieved under their sponsorship in the East Zone, i.e. nationalization, land reform, state owned corporations, Schumacher would undoubtedly conserve them since a Socialist could not be expected to re-introduce free enterprise. Production losses in West German industry that may occur because of withdrawn armament orders would be more than made up for by orders placed by Russia and its satellites, mainly China. In this respect the East German Government has received definite and detailed assurances from Russian authorities, which were confidentially passed on to the West German industries. In Dertinger's opinion these offers would be the biggest assets of unification, whereas in the other case, whoever finally wins a war, "the Ruhr industry will be destroyed right in the beginning".
8. Therefore, West Germany has no other choice but to negotiate and facilitate negotiations for unification. He admitted that negotiations which could not be taken seriously would only compromise his West German partners. He has repeatedly pointed out to the Russians that they would have to endorse all the offers which he (Dertinger) or any of his colleagues in the East German Government made to West Germany. Unfortunately, the Russians have taken this too literally and have done so in a more frightening than encouraging way.

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